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Abstract
This paper examines the contractual practices of African manufacturing ﬁrms using survey
data collected in Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Descriptive
statistics and econometric results are presented. They show that contractual ﬂexibility is per-
vasive and that relational contracting is the norm between manufacturers, their suppliers, and
their clients. The existence of long-term relations between ﬁrms helps them deal with contract
non-performance through negotiation. Confrontational methods such as lawyers and courts are
used only by large ﬁrms and when negotiations fail. Whenever confrontation can be avoided,
business is resumed. Of the six studied countries, incidence of breach and the use of lawyers and
courts are highest in Zimbabwe which is also the country with legal institutions that best support
business. Our favored interpretation is that good legal institutions incite ﬁrms to take more
chances, thereby encouraging trade and leading to more cases of breach and more recourse to
courts and lawyers. A high frequency of contract non-compliance should thus not be interpreted
as a sign of imperfect legal institutions.
________________
1 Correspondence to be sent to Marcel Fafchamps, Center for the Study of African Economies, University of
Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UL (United Kingdom). Email: marcel.fafchamps@economics.ox.ac.uk.This paper investigates the contractual practices of African manufacturing ﬁrms and exam-
ines whether economic agents use long-term relationships to make contractual performance con-
tingent upon external shocks. Evidence to this effect has already been uncovered in credit tran-
sactions among villagers (e.g., Udry (1990, 1994), Fafchamps and Lund (1999)) and ﬁshermen
(e.g., Platteau and Abraham (1987)). In contrast to these earlier works that focused on small indi-
vidual transactions in a rural setting, this paper analyzes the extent of contractual ﬂexibility
among large manufacturing ﬁrms.
Very little is known about how African markets operate in practice. Fafchamps et al.
(1994), Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995), and Fafchamps (1996) have shown that con-
tracts between African manufacturers and their suppliers and clients often are renegotiated: sup-
plies occasionally arrive late or their quality is different from what was ordered, and clients
sometimes pay late. Although some modicum of contractual ﬂexibility is prevalent the world
over, casual observation and anthropological accounts (e.g., Cohen (1969), Meillassoux (1971),
Amselle (1977), Geertz, Geertz and Rosen (1979)) suggest that African ﬁrms have a more elastic
deﬁnition of ﬂexibility -- to the point where it may have become a source of misunderstanding
and cultural prejudice. In their dealings with Africans, for instance, foreigners are often taken by
surprise by contractual delays and calls for contractual renegotiation, from which they are quick
to conclude that African ﬁrms (and Africans in general) are unreliable and opportunistic. This is
true not only of the occasional traveller, but also of western ﬁrms wishing to source products
from Africa (e.g., Biggs et al. (1994)). This may explain why foreign ﬁrms ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deal
with Africans and why African manufacturers have a hard time breaking into export markets. If
conﬁrmed by rigorous analysis, this interpretation opens avenues for export promotion other than
structural adjustment and devaluation.
This paper examines evidence on contractual ﬂexibility among African manufacturing
ﬁrms using data collected in six countries: Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe. The empirical analysis tests simple theoretical predictions regarding the
incidence of contractual problems and the way contractual disputes are resolved. Results provide
the ﬁrst empirical evidence regarding the extent of and local remedies to contractual non-
performance in African manufacturing. They now need to be compared with contractual prac-
tices in other parts of the world.
Our results are consistent with the idea that contractual ﬂexibility is a rational response to
risk. Expectations regarding contractual performance are thus likely to reﬂect the environment in
which ﬁrms operate: the riskier the environment, the higher the need for ﬂexibility, the higher the
incidence of contract non-performance, and the higher the expectation of renegotiation. Results
also show that, of the six countries studied, incidence of breach and the use of lawyers and courts
are highest in Zimbabwe. Since Zimbabwe is probably the country in the sample where legal
institutions best support business (e.g., Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995)), this ﬁnding
contradicts the idea that a high frequency of contract non-compliance is a sign of imperfect legal
institutions and unsophisticated business practices. We similarly ﬁnd that large ﬁrms are both
more likely to encounter contract non-compliance and to make use of lawyers and courts. Taken
together, these results suggest that access to supportive legal institutions incite ﬁrms to take more
chances with suppliers and clients, thereby encouraging trade while at the same time resulting in
more cases of breach and more recourse to courts and lawyers. In contrast, ﬁrms that have little
or no access to courts must rely on alternative institutions such as business relationships and
social networks, and adopt cruder business practices to minimize their exposure to contractual
risk (e.g., Fafchamps (1999b, 1999c)). Similar conclusions are reached by Fafchamps and Minten
(1999b).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a brief review of the theoretical litera-
ture on markets and contractual ﬂexibility. Descriptive evidence on African manufacturers is
presented in Section 2. Detailed econometric analysis is discussed in Section 3.2 
Section 1. A Brief Review of Theory
The last two decades have witnessed a world-wide renewed faith in the capacity of market
forces to allocate resources efﬁciently. Governments have been advised to stop meddling in the
allocation process and to let the ’free market’ reign. Very little, however, is know as to how a free
market actually operates in practice. In particular, we know precious little about how ﬁrms deal
with each other. For instance, it is unclear how ﬁrms which otherwise compete with each other
and have opposed interests manage to prevent opportunistic breach of contract. Yet if the market
is to do a better resource allocation job than the government, then surely it must deter or at least
minimize cheating among economic agents.
Markets and Opportunism
Microeconomic textbooks depict market transactions as simple exchanges whose economic
content is fully described by price and quantity. Evidence collected in Africa and elsewhere sug-
gests otherwise. Purchases of inputs and sales of output -- let alone the provision of labor or
credit -- are plagued by a variety of moral hazard, adverse selection, and contract enforcement
problems that shape economic exchange and determine how efﬁcient markets are (on African
manufacturing, see for instance the empirical evidence reported by Fafchamps (1996), Fisman
and Raturi (1999), Raturi and Swamy (1999), Fafchamps and Minten (1999a, 1999b)). Before we
can progress in our understanding of how African markets work in practice, we need a theory of
market exchange that can account for these features.
In this respect, recent theoretical developments provide a fertile source of inspiration.
Building upon the work of Kranton (1996a) and Ghosh and Ray (1996), Fafchamps (1998) for-
mally shows that a decentralized market can discipline itself if cheating is interpreted as a sign of
incompetence. The mechanism by which opportunism is deterred, however, leads to markets that
differ signiﬁcantly from those described in economic textbooks. For one thing, exchange is not
anonymous but relational: ﬁrms economize on screening incompetent partners by establishing
long-term relationships with other ﬁrms they have learn to trust. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz’s
(1984) model of unemployment as a disciplining device, cheating by competent agents is
deterred by the fear of having to search for a new partner.
Relational contracting is, however, an impediment to fully efﬁcient exchange because it
makes it costly for ﬁrms to switch partners. This may be alright in stable economic environments
in which patterns of exchange are constant over time. But if ﬁrms must respond to rapidly chang-
ing economic conditions by constantly seeking new partners, being stuck with the same partner
forever is not optimal. In this case, Greif (1993) and Fafchamps (1998) have shown that informa-
tion sharing can theoretically increase the ﬂuidity of exchange by reducing the penalty for
switching partner.2
The above mentioned work suffers from one major shortcoming, however: it assumes that
cheating is a cut and dry affair, i.e., that ﬁrms can always honor their contractual obligations, and
that the only problem is to ensure they do. In real life, however, circumstances arise in which
ﬁrms are unable to comply with a contract: a power outage may delay production, civil strife may
interfere with delivery, or the central bank may not release the foreign exchange on time. The cir-
cumstances that impede contractual performance may be temporary or permanent. If they are
temporary, it would be silly to destroy a perfectly good relationship simply because one of the
partners is temporarily unable to perform. Intuitively, it is in the interest of the two parties to
work things out until the difﬁculty is over. Fafchamps (1996) indeed demonstrates theoretically
that if there are exogenous circumstances in which one party, say A, is unable to comply with its
contractual obligations, then it is not in the interest of the other party B to insist on harsh punish-
ment for breach of contract. Doing so would only incite A to refuse to trade ex ante.3
________________
2 To achieve this purpose, however, the stigmatization of cheaters may be necessary; see Milgrom, North and
Weingast (1991) and Fafchamps (1998) for details. Firms may also seek to economize on screening costs by relying
on statistical discrimination or by refusing to deal with ﬁrms outside their network. Empirical evidence on these issues
is presented in Greif (1994) and Fafchamps (1999a).
3 To see why, consider the following caricatural example. Suppose a bank proposes to lend you one million dollars
free of interest but stipulates that, in case the money is not repaid in full by a given date, you will be executed. To the3 
In this case, theory suggests that it is optimal for the parties to recognize that exogenous
circumstances may prevent them from honoring their obligations and to build ﬂexibility into the
contract. When exchange is relational, ﬂexibility is facilitated by the implicit agreement that
binds the parties: if one party feels cheated, it can decide to break the relationship and force the
other party to look for another supplier or client. In addition, the aggrieved party may seek
reparation by enlisting the help of an external contract enforcement agency. The existence of an
implicit threat to seek outside reparation only if trust has been broken helps the parties to
economize on writing the contract. There is no need to write all contingencies down; all that is
required is that parties apply the contract in good faith, that is, to the best of their capacity. These
theoretical arguments are clear and have been formalized elsewhere (e.g., Hart and Holmstrom
(1987), Fafchamps (1996)). What is unclear is whether they are relevant at all in practice.
Contract Flexibility
Evidence suggests that market transactions, far from being rigid contracts, exhibit an unex-
pected degree of ﬂexibility (e.g., Lorenz (1988) for France, and Fafchamps (1996), Fafchamps,
Pender and Robinson (1995) for Africa). To fully understand how markets operate in practice, we
need to conceptually understand what ﬂexibility means and why it exists. Flexibility arises when
contractual performance is made explicitly or implicitly contingent upon external events
affecting one of the parties. The idea is that a supplier who cannot deliver or client who cannot
pay is allowed to renegotiate the contract and default from his or her original obligations. Flexi-
bility is thus a form of insurance, of risk sharing.
Fafchamps (1996) has argued that, from a theoretical perspective, economic exchange can-
not take place unless contract are ﬂexible. This is because parties can never to totally sure they
can comply with their contractual obligations: external events may prevent them from doing so.
Unless they can exonerate themselves from obligations that have become too onerous, they will
refuse to engage themselves.
Allowing parties too much ﬂexibility, however, is opening room for much abuse. Contrac-
tual obligations must therefore be sufﬁciently ﬂexible that parties are not afraid to engage them-
selves, but not so ﬂexible that opportunistic behavior is overtly encouraged. The ease with which
agents can monitor each other makes it possible to condition contractual performance on cir-
cumstances that affect them. How much information circulates may depend on local information
sharing institutions -- and the ability to cross-check information -- and on agents’ capacity to per-
sonally monitor each other. One of the objectives of this paper is to provide empirical evidence
on how ﬂexibility operates in practice.
Section 2. Evidence from African Manufacturing
In this section we provide evidence of relational contracting and contract ﬂexibility among
African manufacturing ﬁrms. We also seek to identify a set of robust predictors of contractual
risk and of choices of dispute resolution methods. The data that we use for this purpose come
from surveys of manufacturing ﬁrms conducted in six countries of Sub-Saharan Africa: Burundi,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The surveys were conducted by a
variety of national teams coordinated by the Regional Program of Enterprise Development
(RPED) of the World Bank. Although the data are generally comparable, occasional discrepan-
cies occur and some data are not available for certain countries.
In each of the six countries, random samples were drawn among manufacturing ﬁrms in
four sectors of economic activity: textile and garment; metal products; wood and furniture; and
food processing (see Table 1). Samples sizes vary from 120 ﬁrms in Burundi to 238 ﬁrms in Cam-
eroon. Firms with fewer than 5 employees were excluded from the sample. The data thus
represent the small to large scale manufacturing sector in Africa; microenterprises are ignored. In
most countries, sample ﬁrms were revisited several times at one year interval. Questions on con-
tractual disputes and on relationships with clients and suppliers, however, were only asked in the
________________
extent that circumstances beyond your control may prevent you from repaying the bank with absolute certainty, you
may very well decide that the contract is unattractive.4 
ﬁrst survey round. Efforts to design a questionnaire that would work in many different countries
and would apply to large and small ﬁrms alike led to some compromises. In particular, the ques-
tionnaire had to be understood by all respondents, including those will little formal education, no
accounting, and unsophisticated business practices. This led to the elimination of questions that
required proper accounts or a thorough understanding of standard business practices such as
invoicing, payment date, and ﬁnance charges. As a result, the data collected are at time a bit
fuzzy as they involve judgement values by respondents, e.g., on what constitutes a ’late payment’
(see infra). In spite of these shortcomings, the RPED data are probably the best available source
of information on manufacturing in Sub-Saharan Africa. They also contain an unusual amount of
information on relationships between ﬁrms and their clients and suppliers.
Characteristics of surveyed ﬁrms
The characteristics of sample ﬁrms are summarized in Table 1. The average number of
employees for the six countries is 144; sample ﬁrms are largest in Zimbabwe (301 workers on
average), and smallest in Burundi (76). The Zimbabwe sample is made of relatively old ﬁrms
with an average age of 25 years; younger ﬁrms are found in the three French-speaking countries
of the sample. Sixty percent of the surveyed ﬁrms have a legal status that limits the liability of
the ﬁrm to its own assets; other ﬁrms are held either in sole proprietorship or in partnership. Over
one quarter of the surveyed ﬁrms operate under partial or complete foreign ownership, with a
high of 62% in Côte d’Ivoire and a low of 12% in Zambia. Partial or complete state ownership
occurs for less than 5% of sample ﬁrms.
The ethnic makeup of the sample ﬁrms varies dramatically among countries. In two of the
six countries, less than half of the sample ﬁrms have ethnic Africans as owners. Ethnic Europe-
ans are predominant in Zimbabwe and maintain a strong presence in Cameroon and Côte
d’Ivoire. Asians occupy a dominant position in Kenyan manufacturing and are present elsewhere
as well (e.g., Himbara (1994)).4
The way ﬁrms deal with clients and suppliers is depicted in Table 2. Most surveyed ﬁrms
sell at least part of their output to end-users of their products such as manufacturers and consu-
mers; the rest is sold primarily to wholesalers and retailers. About a quarter of surveyed ﬁrms do
at least some of their business with publicly owned entities. On average, sample ﬁrms export
9.6% of their output; this proportion is highest in Côte d’Ivoire and lowest in Zambia. Some form
of written agreement -- e.g., a signed invoice -- is used in less than half the sales to clients. The
explanation lies in the length of the relationship that binds ﬁrms with their clients. Data on the
number of years ﬁrms have dealt with their clients are not available but the data show that ﬁrms
have on average dealt for close to 8 years with their problematic customers, that is, those that
recently failed to pay or paid late. Problematic customers are primarily individual consumers.
Roughly one tenth of late and non-payment cases occur with relatives or kin.5
More detailed information is available on ﬁrms’ suppliers (see second part of Table 2). A
quarter of the ﬁrms deal with at least one monopolist among their major suppliers, i.e., a ﬁrm who
is the sole available source of a particular input. Monopolies appear more commonplace in Zim-
babwe, a feature already noted by Gunning and Mumbengegwi (1995) and a possible heritage of
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) period during which an international embargo
forced the country to be self-sufﬁcient. A quarter of surveyed ﬁrms’ inputs are imported; the rest
is bought locally, possibly from importers. Firms in Burundi and Cameroon are more likely to be
direct importers of inputs than ﬁrms in the other four countries.
________________
4 Recent evidence of the role of ethnicity in African manufacturing is provided, for instance, by Fafchamps
(1999a), Fisman (1999) and Raturi and Swamy (1999).
5 Respondents were asked to mention whether the problematic client was either (1) a relative or family member;
(2) a member of the same tribe or ethnic group; or (3) none of the above. They seem to have interpreted the question
of ethnicity in the narrower sense of kinship. For instance, even in a country such as Burundi where 82% of
respondents are Africans and where Hutus constitute close to 90% of the population, only 7% of the respondents said
that the problematic client was from the same ethnic group. This could not have occurred if respondents had
interpreted ethnicity as meaning Hutu or Tutsi or white.5 
Firms are extremely loyal to their suppliers. They purchase on average close to three quar-
ters of their most important inputs from the same suppliers, whom they have known for 9.5 years
on average. Only a ﬁfth of the ﬁrms place infrequent orders; others have regular relationships
with suppliers. These relationships, however, are primarily based on business acquaintance, not
family or ethnicity; only 6% of the surveyed ﬁrms mention that one of their regular suppliers is a
relative or personal friend; 12% have a supplier who is from the same ’ethnic group’ as them.
Less than 40% of the surveyed ﬁrms receive credit from their supplier; this proportion is
lowest in Zambia and highest in Zimbabwe. The average payment term over all sample ﬁrms is
three weeks; it is of course higher for those who receive supplier credit. Trade credit among Afri-
can manufacturing ﬁrms is discussed in detail in Cuevas et al. (1993), Fafchamps et al. (1994),
Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995), and Fafchamps (1997). In contrast, advance payment is
rare: only 4.3% of the surveyed ﬁrms resort to it, often because the supplier insists on it.
Table 2 also reports the characteristics of problematic suppliers, that is, those who fail to
deliver on time or who deliver deﬁcient quality.6 Less than 10% of all cases of breach occur with
ﬁrst-time suppliers, possibly because ﬁrms do so little of their business with unfamiliar sup-
pliers.7 On average, ﬁrms have known problematic suppliers for 8.2 years -- only marginally less
than the length of time they have known their suppliers in general. Problematic suppliers are pri-
marily other ﬁrms; less than 13% of recent cases of contract non-performance were with public
ﬁrms.
Incidence of breach of contract and dispute resolution methods
Next we turn to the incidence of contractual disputes with clients (Table 3). The data show
that roughly two thirds of the sample ﬁrms experienced some cases of late payment by clients
during the 12 months preceding the survey; close to half of them faced cases of non payment.8
With 23.4 occurrences of late payment per year, the annual average of late payment cases is
close to ten times the average number of non-payment cases, suggesting that late payment is a
more common phenomenon than non payment.
In the great majority of cases of late and non payment, ﬁrms attempt to resolve the problem
through direct negotiations with the client. This proportion is highest in Cameroon and Burundi,
lowest in Zimbabwe. A small number of ﬁrms resort to private arbitration loosely deﬁned;9 Some
8.7% of sampled ﬁrms ever called the police for help, or threatened to do so. In one fourth of the
problematic cases, the dispute was either brought to the attention of lawyers and ended up in
court, or the threat of legal action was resorted to by the parties. Sharp differences exist among
countries: Zimbabwean ﬁrms were much more likely to go (or threaten to go) to court than those
in Burundi -- a possible reﬂection on the relative reliability of their court systems and the size of
surveyed ﬁrms in each country. Nearly one half the cases of late and non payment were settled
by the time of the survey. Most of the respondents were satisﬁed with the terms of the settlement,
________________
6 In the RPED surveys, the deﬁnition of what constitutes late delivery or deﬁcient quality was de facto left to
individual respondents. Surveyed ﬁrms were simply asked whether they experienced cases of late delivery and
deﬁcient quality over the 12 months preceding the survey and, if yes, how many times this occurred. Attempts to
collect data on the number of days elapsed between promised delivery date and actual delivery failed: most
respondents simply do not remember. Besides, the concept of promised delivery date is an ambiguous one in a world
where ﬁrms do not truly expect contractual dates to be complied with. Respondents’ response should thus be
understood as referring to cases in which delivery occurred later than they expected.
7 Another possibility is that ﬁrst-time suppliers make more effort if they wish to establish a relationship.
8 As in the case of late delivery, the deﬁnition of what constitutes a late payment was left to respondents. The
reason for doing so is the same: most respondents do not keep track of the length of time elapsed between due date
and actual payment date. Besides, given that African banks take several days to clear checks, and that many checks
bounce, the actual payment date is a blurred concept. A late payment is thus a payment that is considered delinquent
by the respondent, i.e., the payment occurred after the date at which the respondent expected payment to be made.
9 Strictly deﬁned, private arbitration is a process by which parties to a contract agree to grant authority to a third
party to legally resolve a dispute between them. The arbitrator has the power to adjudicate the dispute and his or her
judgement is, in many developed countries, granted the full protection of the law, at par with other judgements. It
unlikely that all respondents were acquainted with this legal deﬁnition; their answers probably lump together formal
arbitrators and informal mediators with no adjudication power.6 
with little difference across countries. Parties continued to trade in 43.8% of the cases -- more in
Burundi, less in Zimbabwe -- suggesting that dispute resolution methods are moderately success-
ful in solving disputes and bringing parties back together.
Contractual disputes with suppliers are less frequent and less dramatic (see second part of
Table 3). A third of the surveyed ﬁrms experienced a late delivery in the year preceding the sur-
vey. Untimely delivery was complained about most often in Zimbabwe and least often in
Burundi. The number of reported cases is also much higher in Zimbabwe than elsewhere, sug-
gesting that input delivery risk is particularly problematic in Zimbabwe.10 Cases of deﬁcient
quality are reported by one third of the surveyed ﬁrms. As with clients, the most commonly used
dispute resolution method is direct bargaining. Recourse to other dispute resolution methods is
extremely rare: only 3.8% of the surveyed ﬁrms went to see a lawyer following disputes regard-
ing late delivery or deﬁcient quality. Fafchamps (1996) reports similar results for Ghana. Most
disputes with suppliers are settled and ﬁrms continue to trade, even if they are not fully satisﬁed
with the outcome.
To summarize, surveyed ﬁrms have long term relationships with their clients and suppliers
to whom they are very loyal. These relationships are primarily grounded in business acquain-
tance; family, friendship, and ethnicity play little role in fostering them. The data indicate that
contractual disputes occur frequently and that most ﬁrms are affected. Without equivalent data
from other parts of the world, however, we cannot say whether contractual disputes are more fre-
quent in Africa than elsewhere. The majority of contractual disputes are resolved amicably and
trade is resumed in most cases. Direct negotiation is the preferred dispute resolution strategy.
Detailed examination of the data reveals that outside parties such as arbitrators, lawyers, or the
police, are called upon only in more serious cases of contractual breach such as those involving
non payment. Taken together, these results are consistent with the importance of contractual
ﬂexibility in helping ﬁrms deal with risk, and with the role of long-term relationships is helping
ﬁrms resolve contractual disputes through face-to-face negotiation.
Section 3. Econometric analysis
The preceding section has shown that countries differ in the frequency of reported cases of
breach of contract and in the outcome of contractual disputes. These inter-country differences
could, however, arise simply because ﬁrms located in separate countries have different charac-
teristics. To investigate whether there exist ﬁrm characteristics that systematically affect dispute
resolution and can account for some of the inter-country differences, we continue with a mul-
tivariate econometric analysis of the pooled data.
Given the total absence of previous work on these issues in Sub-Saharan Africa and else-
where, we proceed with caution and we refrain from imposing too much structure on the estima-
tion. We seek to identify possible determinants of three basic processes: (1) the incidence and
frequency of contractual disputes; (2) the choice of dispute resolution method, given that a
dispute has arisen; and (3) the outcome of the dispute. We examine these three issues in turn.
The Incidence and Frequency of Contractual Breach
We begin with an investigation of the determinants of the frequency of contractual breach.
To this effect, we estimate logit regressions on whether or not a ﬁrm has experienced at least one
case of breach with a supplier or a client over the 12 months preceding the survey. Regressions
are run for each individual country as well as for the pooled sample of six countries. In the
pooled regressions, location dummies are included to control for systematic differences across
locations.
Theory suggests a variety of forces that may inﬂuence the incidence of non-compliance
and, hence, the kind of regressors that have to be included in the right hand side of the regres-
sions. Following our discussion of the theoretical literature in Section 1, we ﬁrst expect non-
________________
10 Fafchamps, Gunning and Oostendorp (1999) indeed show that contractual risk incites Zimbabwean
manufacturers to accumulate inventories.7 
compliance to reﬂect the environment in which ﬁrms operate: enterprises that buy and sell in
countries or sectors in which breach of contract is frequent should face more problems than ﬁrms
that operate in a more disciplined environment. Three sets of variables are used to control for
market environment effects: location dummies; sectoral dummies; and the average frequency of
contractual disputes and threat of court action faced by ﬁrms similar to the respondent.11 Loca-
tion and sectoral dummies control for a variety of forces that operate at the local or sectoral level.
Their expected effect is as follows.
Theory predicts that dispute resolution methods play an important deterrence role. North
(1990), Platteau (1994a, 1994b), and Greif (1993), for instance, argue that it is the fear of sanc-
tion that induces agents to comply with their contractual obligations. If this understanding is
correct, contractual breach should be less prevalent in countries with good legal institutions.
Given that Zimbabwe has a more developed manufacturing sector and legal institutions generally
responsive to business needs (e.g., Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995)), we would therefore
expect Zimbabwean manufacturers to encounter fewer cases of breach. Since Zimbabwe is the
omitted country and coefﬁcients of country dummies are thus to be interpreted as differences rela-
tive to Zimbabwe, country dummies should be negative if good legal institutions indeed reduce
the incidence of contractual breach.
There is, however, another possibility, namely that good legal institutions encourage ﬁrms
to take more risk because they can obtain reparation from courts. In this case, we would expect
contractual breach to be more prevalent in countries offering better legal protection. Either way,
the presence of good institutions would raise economic efﬁciency by facilitating exchange, but
the source of efﬁciency gains would be different. In the standard case, efﬁciency is increased
because fewer cases of breach occur; in the alternative case, efﬁciency rises because trade takes
place between parties that would otherwise not trade -- or trade differently (e.g., without credit or
delayed delivery). Which efﬁciency gains are larger is an empirical issue.
Small town is the omitted city size. To the extent that small towns provide inferior access to
legal institutions, we expect incidence of breach to be lower in large cities and city size dummies
to a negative effect on the frequency of contract non-compliance. By the same token, food pro-
cessing is the omitted sector and sector dummy coefﬁcients are relative to the food sector. Given
that food products are perishable and their quality variable, we expect more delivery and quality
problems in the food sector. Finally, to the extent that business environment, we expect the aver-
age frequency of non-compliance to have a positive and signiﬁcant effect on the incidence of
breach as ﬁrms adjust their expectations.
The incidence of contractual non-compliance is also likely to vary with characteristics of
the ﬁrm. Larger ﬁrms, for instance, conduct more transactions and are thus expected to encounter
more problems than small ﬁrms.12 Older ﬁrms may have identiﬁed more reliable clients and sup-
pliers and thus face fewer problems with unreliable ﬁrms.13 The trust they have in their clients
and suppliers, however, may induce them to accept delayed deliveries and payment because they
believe contractual obligations will eventually be satisﬁed. The net effect of ﬁrm age is thus
ambiguous. Firms with a limited liability status may be more willing to take risk with clients and
suppliers and are thus expected to face more cases of non-compliance. Regressors for ﬁrm size,
________________
11 These averages are constructed by country and sector, i.e., a textile ﬁrm in Kenya has a different average from a
metal ﬁrm in Kenya or a textile ﬁrm in Cameroon. In addition, each observation is omitted from its own average to
avoid endogeneity bias. Because of high multicollinearity across average frequency measures, a single frequency
measure is used in the regression analysis: the frequency of late payment in regressions involving clients, and the
frequency of late deliveries in regressions involving suppliers. In all regressions, the average frequency of threat of
court action refers to payment disputes with clients -- the type of contractual breach that is most likely to result in
legal proceedings.
12 The number of transactions in which a ﬁrm is engaged over a set period of time is not proportional to size,
however, since larger ﬁrms typically engage in larger transactions. Moreover, ﬁrms may differ in what they mean by a
transaction. For a small ﬁrm selling purely on a cash basis, a transaction is a single sale or purchase; for a large ﬁrm, a
transaction can be an order or an invoice, depending on the context. These differences complicate the collection of
data across ﬁrms of different sizes.
13 Bade and Chifamba (1994) and Fafchamps (1997, 1999a), for instance, provide evidence to this effect.8 
age, and legal status are thus included in the regression to control for these possible inﬂuences.
Given the existence of business network effects in African manufacturing, as shown by
Fafchamps (1999a), Barr (1997)), and Fisman (1999), one also expects better connected ﬁrm
managers to screen clients and suppliers more easily and thus to experience fewer cases of
breach. Although RPED surveys did not, as a rule, ask questions on membership in business net-
works, Fafchamps (1999a) and Raturi and Swamy (1999) have shown that the ethnicity of the
owner/manager is an important predictor of network membership (see also Fisman (1999)). The
available evidence suggests that ethnic African manufacturers are, in general, less well con-
nected and, as a result, disadvantaged in access to supplier credit (e.g., Fafchamps (1999a)). We
also suspect that foreign or state owned ﬁrms are better connected to other manufacturers, either
through their mother company or through the state. We therefore include a dummy for ethnic
African and ethnic European management; Asian management is the omitted category. For the
same reason, we include dummies for ﬁrms that have some with foreign or state ownership. If
business networks mitigate non-compliance, we expect better connected ﬁrms -- typically,
foreign ﬁrms, state ﬁrms, and respondents of Asian or European ascent -- to encounter fewer
cases of non-compliance.
It is also possible that the attitude of ﬁrms vis a vis contracts reﬂects cultural values that are
shaped by ethnic identiﬁcation, as argued by Greif (1993, 1994) in the case of medieval traders.
Certain groups may have higher standards of contractual compliance and thus be quicker to clas-
sify an incident as breach. In the African case, this may be relevant for foreign owned ﬁrms or
managers of European ascent. If cultural expectations are important, we would expect these ﬁrms
to report more cases of breach. Note that the network and culture effects operate in opposite
directions in the case of European and foreign owned ﬁrms.
The nature of the relationships that ﬁrms maintain with their clients and suppliers could
also affect the incidence of contractual problems. Here we are constrained by the nature of the
information collected in the surveys. For clients, we include the share of exports in total sales, as
well as dummies for whether the ﬁrm sells to individual end-users and whether it sells to public
entities. Although payment delays in export markets are longer (e.g., Fafchamps (1997)), the
institutional mechanism of the letter of credit should reduce the incidence of payment problems
in exports since payment by the buyer’s bank is automatic upon presentation of the transport
documents. Selling to traders (the omitted category) is generally perceived to be safer than sel-
ling to individual end-users such as manufacturers and ﬁnal consumers. The reason is that traders
are in general more liquid and have a faster cash turn-around (e.g., Fafchamps and Minten
(1999a)). Selling to public entities is expected to raise the incidence of payment problems
because governments everywhere, but particularly in Africa, are notorious for paying late.
For suppliers, more information is available. We include indicators of market power (share
of imported inputs plus dummies for whether the ﬁrm faces a monopolistic supplier or a public
supplier for at least one of its inputs); indicators of social capital (length of relationship with sup-
pliers, percentage of purchases from main suppliers, and dummies whether ﬁrm buys from family
and friends and whether ﬁrm only makes infrequent purchases); and indicators of credit terms
(dummies for whether the ﬁrm receives supplier credit and whether it gives advance payment).
We expect market power to raise the incidence of contractual problems since monopolists can
more easily get away with breach. In contrast, we anticipate stronger relationships with suppliers
to reduce the frequency of problems. Finally, we expect that contracts involving credit open more
room for breach and thus should raise the frequency of non-compliance. Because the nature of
the relationships that ﬁrms maintain with clients and suppliers is potentially endogenous, results
should only be interpreted as indicative of empirical regularities.
We now investigate whether the data support the above conjectures. Logit regressions on
the incidence of contractual non-compliance by clients and suppliers are presented in Tables 4
and 5. Pooled sample results are presented in full; individual country regressions are summarized
as the percentage of countries for which the effect of the regressor is positive, positive and
signiﬁcant, and negative and signiﬁcant, respectively. Coefﬁcients of the pooled regression are
reported in the form of odds ratio to improve readability; an odds ratio greater (smaller) than one
means the regressor raises (reduces) the probability of a contractual problem.14
________________
14 More speciﬁcally, an odds ratio measures the effect of a one unit change in a regressor on the probability of9 
Results indicate that there are signiﬁcant differences across countries and sectors but also
that these differences are not well captured by contract environment variables.15 Zimbabwe (the
omitted country) has a higher incidence of problems with clients and suppliers. Since Zimbabwe
also is the country in our sample with the most advanced manufacturing sector and the most
developed legal system, these results cast doubt on the idea that a high incidence of contractual
breach is synonymous with lack of market sophistication. If anything, contract non-compliance
appears more likely in better developed economies where contracts are more complex and the
potential for disputes larger. For instance, the likelihood of late payment is higher if an element
of credit has entered the contract; similarly, late delivery is more likely if the client ﬁrm has
placed an order for future delivery.
As expected the incidence of problems is higher among large ﬁrms, but the effect is not
signiﬁcant for all countries and all forms of contractual non-compliance. Older ﬁrms appear to
face more non-payment problems, not less, but they face fewer problems with suppliers.
African-managed ﬁrms face more cases of non-payment than Asian-managed ﬁrms. The
difference with European-managed ﬁrms in not signiﬁcant, however. These results are difﬁcult to
interpret given that cultural differences about what constitutes normal contractual behavior may
have affected responses to enumerators.
Regarding the effect of relation-speciﬁc variables, we ﬁnd that selling to or buying from
public ﬁrms raises the probability of disputes; the effect is signiﬁcant only for late payment, how-
ever. In contrast, selling in export markets reduces the incidence of payment problems. The effect
is large: a ﬁrm that exports all its output is 2.5 (2.8) times less likely to experience a late (non)
payment problem than a ﬁrm that exports nothing. This may be due increased reliance on institu-
tional mechanisms such as the letter of credit rather than exemplary behavior on the part of inter-
national buyers.16 On the supplier side, late delivery is more frequent among ﬁrms that import
their raw materials, a likely reﬂection of the vagaries of African transportation and port systems.
There is much variation across individual countries, however. These issues deserve more investi-
gation.
On the supplier side, we ﬁnd that monopolistic suppliers do not, in general, take advantage
of their market power: if anything, the incidence of contractual problems is lower with monopo-
listic suppliers.17 Surprisingly, ﬁrms that make infrequent purchases encounter fewer problems.
One likely explanation is that these ﬁrms are very small and operate on a cash-and-carry basis
only -- what Fafchamps and Minten (1999b) call the ﬂea market economy. Another surprising
result is that ﬁrms that buy from family and friends encounter more late delivery problems. One
possible interpretation is that it is harder to put pressure on family and friends than on regular
suppliers. Finally, as expected, problems are much more frequent among ﬁrms that receive or
give credit to their suppliers, a result consistent with the idea that contractual breach is more
likely in more complex contracts. But the effect is signiﬁcant only for deﬁcient quality in the
pooled regression.
So far, we have only a single piece of information, namely, whether respondent ﬁrms
reported having experience contractual non-compliance. We now examine the reported number
of cases of non-compliance using a simple tobit regression.18 Results are presented in Tables 6
________________
experiencing at least a dispute per year, computed at the average value of all regressors. For instance, an odds ratio of
2.4 for the textile sector (Table 4) means that textile manufacturers are 2.4 times more likely than food processing
manufacturers (the omitted category) to experience at least one late payment problem in the survey year.
15 Unreported regression results show that, when country and sectoral dummies are omitted, environment variables
are very signiﬁcant. Once country and sector dummies are included, however, they are no longer signiﬁcant. This may
be due to multicollinearity, given the way environment variables are constructed. This issue deserves more research.
16 The survey did not collect data on recourse to the letter of credit system, but informal discussions with
respondents in Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe indicate that letters of credit are used in most imports and exports from
outside of Africa. Because of the informal nature of much intra-African trade, respondents seldom export or import
within Africa themselves and prefer to rely on intermediaries. The only possible exception is trade with South-Africa.
17 To recall, ﬁrms with monopolistic suppliers are deﬁned as those who report that at least one of their main
suppliers is the sole available source of a particular input.
18 Tobit regression is the appropriate estimator in this case because it corrects for the fact that the dependent
variable is censored at zero, i.e., that a large proportion of ﬁrms report zero problems with clients or suppliers. Data on10 
and 7. They conﬁrm that the incidence of payment problems is much larger in Zimbabwe than in
the other surveyed countries, and that large ﬁrms unmistakably face more contractual problems
than smaller ﬁrms -- hardly a surprise since they are involved in more transactions. Older ﬁrms
seem to do better with suppliers, a result in agreement with the idea that there are returns to
experience in choosing and dealing with suppliers. Tobit regression results also conﬁrm that
exporters experience fewer payment problems, probably thanks to the letter of credit system.
European-managed ﬁrms report more late payment and deﬁcient quality problems, contrary to
what the business network idea had led us to expect, but a possible reﬂection of different cultural
expectations. Other characteristics are in general not signiﬁcant, possibly because of endogeneity
or omitted variable bias. A thorough investigation of the causality between these various factors
requires instruments that are not available in these data and is left fur future research.
Dispute Resolution Methods
According to our current understanding of market institutions (e.g., North (1990), Platteau
(1994a, 1994b), and Greif (1993)), the fear of sanction is what induces agents to comply with
contractual obligations. These sanctions can take several forms which are discussed, for instance,
by Fafchamps (1996), namely: guilt; harassment; loss of relationship and reputation; recourse to
legal institutions such as courts and lawyers; and recourse to private arbitration and, more prosai-
cally, the police. We focus here on two types of sanctions that are important in practice: legal
recourse, and loss of relationship.19
Simple theoretical models of relationships such as the ones presented by Kandori (1992),
Greif (1993), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Kali (1999), Kranton (1996b), and Fafchamps (1998)
predict that sanctions are applied as soon as breach of contract occurs.20 Which type of sanction
is chosen depends on their relative cost and effectiveness. Given the existence of ﬁxed costs in
legal proceedings, the threat of legal action is seldom credible for small size transactions. Suing a
poor individual with no assets is rarely cost effective: the chance of recovering anything by legal
means is slim so that it is not worth incurring lawyers and court fees. Suing may also be unattrac-
tive if the contractual dispute is complex and the evidence hard to verify, so that the outcome of
the court process is uncertain. In contrast, breaking a relationship is likely to be counterproduc-
tive if the other party is sole buyer or seller. Legal sanctions may not work either; harassment
may be the only viable alternative.
Whenever there exist uncertainty regarding the cause for breach of contract, immediate
sanctions need not be optimal; a more gradual approach may be called for. To see why, suppose
for instance that agents can be hit by two types of shocks: temporary shocks and permanent
shocks. The former make it impossible for agents to comply with their contractual obligations for
a single period only; the latter make the agent permanently unable to comply (e.g., bankruptcy).
Intuitively, applying harsh sanctions is appropriate only when the other party has been hit by a
permanent shock. If the shock is only temporary, both parties are better offrenegotiating the con-
tract and preserving their relationship. In these circumstances, the natural response to a breach of
contract is for both parties to negotiate until it becomes clear that the shock is permanent, at
which point hard sanctions are applied.
The negotiation subgame is itself fraught with problems, however. Waiting for too long
before suing may enable the breaching party to hide assets and evade legal sanctions. The nego-
tiation process is thus likely to be limited in time. Renegotiation also introduces an insurance-
like element into the contract. By analogy with the beneﬁts agents can obtain by ﬁling false
insurance claims, parties may proﬁt by calling for undue renegotiation, thereby abusing the other
________________
the number of breaches were not collected in Cameroon; this country thus has to be dropped from the analysis.
19 Evidence of reputational sanctions in developed economies is presented, for instance, by Fukuyama (1995),
Lorenz (1988), and Bernstein (1992, 1996). Hart (1988), Banerjee and Duﬂo (1999), Haggard, McMillan and
Woodruff (1996), McMillan and Naughton (1996), Banerjee and Munshi (1999), Fafchamps and Minten (1999b), and
Fafchamps (1996, 1997, 1999a) present evidence for Africa and Asia. Historical evidence is provided, for instance, by
Ensminger (1992) and Greif (1993, 1994).
20 This is but an application of the optimal penal code principle of Abreu (1988): gradual sanctions are
unnecessary; optimal deterrence is obtained when harsh sanctions are used to punish all deviations from cooperation.11 
party’s willingness to renegotiate contract terms. As a result, agents unable to monitor the situa-
tion of the other party may optimally refuse to renegotiate for fear of abuse and may opt for hard
sanctions instead.
Although, as argued by Benson (1990), market exchange would become impossible in the
total absence of sanctions for breach of contract, punishment of all breach of contract is not
required; it is sufﬁcient that breach of contract be punished with a sufﬁciently high probability.
Consequently, some agents may be able to free-ride the system, i.e., refrain from incurring any of
the costs associated with dispute resolution and yet expect a low probability of breach. By the
same token, agents may choose to randomize, i.e., to punish only a certain percentage of breach
they incur. In these cases and when it is clear that pursuing the breaching party is futile, doing
nothing may well be the optimal strategy.
This brief, heuristic discussion leads us to expect ﬁrms to differ in the way they seek to
resolve breach of contract. First, we expect to observe across countries and sectors some
differences in reliance on legal institutions that reﬂect the cost and predictability of legal
recourse. We control for such effects via location and sectoral dummies and the average
incidence of contractual disputes. Second, large ﬁrms are more likely to engage in large transac-
tions and thus more likely to ﬁnd legal action cost effective. Third, older ﬁrms may have acquired
better negotiation and monitoring skills, and are likely to be more familiar with legal institutions.
We therefore expect them to be less likely to do nothing when faced with contractual problems.
To the extent that limited liability status creates a moral hazard problem and weakens incentives,
we expect such ﬁrms to be more casual about contractual breach and hence to be more likely to
do nothing. Firms may also use their business contacts to monitor contract renegotiation; as a
result we expect ethnic Africans to be more likely to either do nothing or use legal recourses
given that they have fewer business connections in several of the countries we study, such as
Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe.21 We also include dummy variables indicating whether the ﬁrm
has some foreign or state ownership. Next, ﬁrms that value relationships ought to put more
emphasis on direct bargaining once problems occur. In contrast, ﬁrms that face monopolistic sell-
ers may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to seek legal reparation. Finally, ﬁrms receiving or granting credit to their
suppliers ought not to remain inactive when faced with contractual problems. We control for all
these factors with the variables listed in the previous subsection. Again, some of these variables
are potentially subject to endogeneity bias, a bias we cannot correct for because we do not have
good instruments for relationships and network capital. Results should thus be interpreted as sug-
gestive only.
We ﬁrst examine the probability with which ﬁrms seek to negotiate and threaten court
action conditional on having encountered a contractual breach. For clients we divide respon-
dents’ actions into four categories: (1) do nothing; (2) only negotiate; (3) only use legal institu-
tions; and (4) use both bargaining and legal institutions.22 For suppliers, the third and fourth
categories are merged given the small number of observations in each of them.23 Since the fre-
quency of late delivery and deﬁcient quality is much lower than that of recovery problems, there
are much fewer observations on the supplier side.
Since ﬁrms’ actions are divided into more than two categories -- four for disputes with
clients, three for disputes with suppliers -- logit is no longer adequate and a multinomial regres-
sion approach is required. In the interest of simplicity, we opt for multinomial logit estimation.24
By construction, the analysis is conﬁned to the ﬁrms that experienced contractual breach. Given
the small sample size, we limit ourselves to pooled sample regressions. Results are presented in
________________
21 See Barr (1997), Fafchamps (1999a), and Fisman (1999) for evidence.
22 In practice, the former typically precedes the latter, but we have no data on the sequence of ﬁrms’ actions.
23 There are only three cases of exclusive recourse (or threat of recourse) to legal institutions for disputes with
suppliers.
24 Multinomial logit has been criticized for imposing certain restrictions on agents’ choices -- the so-called
independence of irrelevant alternative assumption. Given the exploratory nature of our analysis, the substantial extra
cost of estimating a more general multinomial model is not justiﬁed. Besides, qualitatively similar results are obtained
using logit regressions on each action separately.12 
Tables 8 and 9 for clients and suppliers, respectively. In both Tables, bargaining with the delin-
quent client or supplier is the omitted choice category, Estimated coefﬁcients must therefore be
interpreted as differences relative to ’bargaining only’.25
By far the strongest result emanating from Table 8 is that manufacturers in Zimbabwe are
much more likely that those in other countries to deal with bad payers through legal action. In
addition, we ﬁnd that large ﬁrms are more likely to threaten court action against delinquent
clients or suppliers. The effect is large and signiﬁcant in both Tables. We strongly suspect that
legal institutions are better in Zimbabwe than in the other ﬁve surveyed countries (e.g.,
Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995)). In addition, large ﬁrms probably have easier access to
courts given that the costs of legal proceedings are easier to amortize on larger transactions.
Results from Tables 8 and 9 therefore suggest that ﬁrms with better access to courts make more
use of them.
This conclusion only takes all its meaning if it is combined with the ﬁnding that large
manufacturers and ﬁrms located in Zimbabwe face more cases of contract breach. Indeed these
two ﬁndings combined imply that better access to legal institutions raises both usage of legal
institutions and the frequency of breach. This ﬂies in the face of the commonly held view that
strong legal institutions serve to deter contractual opportunism (e.g., Platteau (1994), North
(1973), Greif (1994)). Our preferred interpretation is that ﬁrms operating under the protection of
an effective legal system take more risk with clients and suppliers and thus face more problems
that they handle through legal channels. The outcome is the same -- legal institutions favor
exchange -- but the channel through which this occurs is not that usually surmised: exchange
expands not so much because breach is deterred directly but because ﬁrms become more daring
in their choice of clients and suppliers.
Among smaller ﬁrms, direct negotiation in delinquent payment cases seems to be the
method of choice, especially for African owners. This may reﬂect a cultural preference for non-
confrontational methods of dispute resolution. The length of the relationship between parties is
seen to reduce the likelihood of going to court, but the effect is signiﬁcant only in delivery cases.
This result is consistent with the idea that valuable relationships serve to discipline contractual
behavior without recourse to external enforcement mechanisms, as shown theoretically by Ghosh
and Ray (1996) and Fafchamps (1998). The severity of the conﬂict also inﬂuences the dispute
resolution method: disputes about late delivery and non-payment are less likely to be dealt with
via bargaining, and more likely to trigger threats of court action, but the effect is not statistically
signiﬁcant for suppliers.
On the supplier side, we see that dealing with monopolistic suppliers reduces the probabil-
ity of doing nothing in response to a contractual dispute. Contrary to expectations, loyalty to sup-
pliers as measured by the percentage of purchases made from main suppliers increases the likeli-
hood of taking no action: loyalty implies trust and hence should facilitate negotiations. Discus-
sions with respondents nevertheless suggest that when parties are extremely well acquainted with
each other, minor contractual problems such as late deliveries and quality problems are handled
so easily and expeditiously that respondents do not perceive negotiation as taking place at all,
i.e., ’problems take care of themselves’. Whenever the problematic supplier is a public ﬁrm,
direct bargaining is less frequent, possibly because it is unlikely to be successful: public agencies
are notorious for being unreliable suppliers so that negotiating with them for late deliveries and
poor quality is probably seen as a waste of time.
________________
25 For instance, a signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient for Kenya in the ’legal institutions only’ column of Table 8 means
that Kenyan manufacturers are much less likely than Zimbabwean to respond to late payment with threats of court
action. Since the coefﬁcient of the Kenya dummy is small and non-signiﬁcant in the other two columns, it means that
Kenyan manufacturers are more likely than Zimbabwean manufacturers to deal with delinquent clients through
negotiations only -- the omitted category. The reason is that, since probabilities sum to one (manufacturers must take
one of the four possible actions), a reduction in the probability of undertaking one action -- legal recourse -- must
translate into a increase in the probability of taking another -- here the omitted category, bargaining.13 
Outcome of Contractual Dispute
We conclude with an analysis of the outcome of contractual disputes. What happens after a
dispute has arisen indeed shapes ﬁrms’ expectations regarding the outcome of disputes: if all
disputes end with sour grapes and broken relationships, it would be optimal for ﬁrms to minimize
the incidence of disputes. If, in contrast, problems with clients and suppliers are successfully
resolved through bargaining or any other means, ﬁrms might be more inclined to take chances
and less likely to insist on rigorous performance of contracts.
To thow light on these issues, survey respondents were asked to comment on ’the most
recent case’ of contractual breach they had encountered. Responses are therefore subject to trun-
cation since some of the most recent contractual disputes have not been settled yet. We do not,
however, have information on when the dispute began, so that we cannot correct for differences
in the duration of disputes. The data nevertheless enable us to examine two issues: ﬁrst, whether
the contractual dispute was settled at the time of the interview and, in this case, whether the
respondent was satisﬁed with the outcome;26 and second, whether the trade relationship contin-
ued after the dispute. Regressors are the same as in previous regressions, except that we also con-
trol for the method of dispute resolution used by respondents.27 Results must be interpreted with
caution because both the outcome of the dispute and the choice of dispute resolution method are
likely to be correlated with the severity of the dispute, which is unobserved. For instance, respon-
dents are unlikely to call upon the police for help unless they feel that it is their only hope of get-
ting satisfaction. The coefﬁcients of dispute resolution methods are thus subject to omitted vari-
able bias and should be interpreted in this light.
With these words of warning, results are presented in Tables 10 and 11 for clients and sup-
pliers respectively. They indicate that direct bargaining is strongly associated with the settlement
of disputes and the resumption of trade. In contrast, recourse to legal institutions such as lawyers,
courts, and police result in a much higher probability of severed business relationship. The use of
lawyers and threats of court action is also associated with less satisfactory resolution of those
disputes that are settled. This is consistent with the idea that ﬁrms seek the protection of legal
institutions only when they lose conﬁdence in the other party. Conversations with respondents
indeed suggest that lawyers and legal threats are not set in motion as long as ﬁrms believe the
other party is acting in good faith, i.e., is trying to comply but is prevented from doing so due to
circumstances beyond its control.
Among other results of interest, we note that African managed ﬁrms are more likely to set-
tle payment disputes and to do so satisfactorily after controling for ﬁrm size, age, country, and
sector of activity. Combined with evidence that shared ethnicity has a positive effect on the set-
tlement of disputes (the positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of the ’relative or same ethnicity’
dummy variable), this can be interpreted as limited evidence of a more lenient attitudes toward
payment disputes and a deeper emphasis on ﬂexibility and negotiation among African
entrepreneurs. Finally, we note that disputes with individual consumers are less likely to be set-
tled, possibly because individual consumers are plenty and are more easily dispensable than
ﬁrms. In contrast, results also show that, of all possible disputes, those with public entities are the
worst: less likely to be settled and less likely to resume trade. One possible explanation for these
results is that trade relationships are more likely to be resumed when respondents view the
breaching party as an individual person than when they view it as an anonymous ﬁrm or public
entity. This issue deserves more research.
Conclusion
We have presented evidence that African manufacturers operate in an environment charac-
terized by contractual non-performance risk. Large ﬁrms face more cases of non-compliance
across the board, possibly because they conduct more transactions. Of the six countries studies,
________________
26 The small number of disputes with suppliers prevented the estimation of the satisfactory settlement regression in
the supplier case.
27 Small sample size prevented the inclusion of dispute resolution methods in the trade continuation regression for
supplier disputes.14 
incidence of contractual breach is much larger in Zimbabwe in spite of the fact that this country
is also the one with the most developed manufacturing sector as well as a good legal and court
system. This ﬁnding contradicts the common view that contractual breach results from imperfect
legal institutions: manufacturing ﬁrms in Zimbabwe are both more likely to encounter problems
and to call upon the legal system when these problems occur. An alternative interpretation is that
Zimbabwean ﬁrms can afford to take more chances, knowing that they can always seek the pro-
tection of the law should a problem arise. If this interpretation is correct, it implies that, unless
ﬁrms feel sufﬁciently protected, they choose to avoid situations in which problems may arise. As
a result, the incidence of problems is lower when legal institutions are less developed and the
manufacturing sector unsophisticated. This may also explain why large ﬁrms, which are more
likely to call upon the legal system, are also those who face more problems. Fafchamps and Min-
ten (1999b) reach similar conclusions regarding agricultural traders in Madagascar. The role of
institutions is further brought to light by the fact that exporting ﬁrms face fewer payment prob-
lems, in spite of having to collect payment from ﬁrms located in other countries. We interpreted
this result as a consequence of the letter of credit mechanism whereby banks located abroad col-
lect payment in the name of the exporting ﬁrm. In contrast, importing ﬁrms face more late
deliveries, probably because of transport and customs delays.
Although more work is required to conﬁrm our results, they are in line with the idea that
most surveyed ﬁrms expect contracts to be ﬂexible. Our ﬁndings indicate that contract non-
performance is handled primarily through direct negotiation. Only if negotiation is unsuccessful
do ﬁrms turn to outsiders such as lawyers and courts and, in certain cases, the police. When this
happens, the parties are extremely unlikely to resume their relationship. The existence of long
term relationships with clients and suppliers appears to serve as a facilitator in these disputes,
raising the probability that the dispute is settled and that the outcome is judged satisfactory.
Relations based on family, friendship, or ethnicity/kinship make it easier for ﬁrms to solve
disputes but also raises the incidence of contract non-performance, the two issues being possibly
linked.
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it demonstrates that regarding
contracts as rigid is not only inaccurate, it also fails to recognize that contractual ﬂexibility is
necessary for market exchange to take place. This ﬁnding is essential for a proper understanding
of how markets operate in practice. Second, although the data did not allow us to ascertain the
direction of causality between participation in international markets and contractual practices,
the evidence presented nevertheless suggest that the relation between the two is strong and
deserves further study. What this paper was able to show is that African manufacturers operate in
an environment where contractual disputes are frequent but are mostly dealt with through direct
negotiation. The great majority of disputes regarding late deliveries are resolved to the satisfac-
tion of the parties and trade is resumed thereafter. The same is true for many disputes regarding
late payment. More work is needed to assess whether African ﬁrms exposed to outside inﬂuences
through trade adopt Western-style contractual practices in their local operations or rather take
advantage of local tolerance for late payment and delivery to meet their stricter obligations
towards international suppliers and clients.
Taken together with evidence that entrepreneurs who are ethnic Africans seek the resolu-
tion of disputes primarily through non-confrontational means, these results suggests that there
may be reasons other than rent seeking and erroneous policies for why Africa trades so little with
the rest of the world, namely that foreign ﬁrms ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deal with African ﬁrms and ﬁnd
them generally unreliable. In particular, attempts by African entrepreneurs to renegotiate
delivery and payment terms ex post -- a relatively common practice in local transactions accord-
ing to the data presented here -- are likely to be misinterpreted as opportunistic. While it would
be ill advised to overplay the idea -- other obstacles to trade remain formidable -- it nevertheless
opens the door to another way of conceiving and, hence, promoting relations between African
and foreign ﬁrms, i.e., trust and network building. This issue deserves further investigation.15 
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.Table 4. Logit Regression on the Incidence of Contractual Non-Compliance By Clients
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Country regressions: Non-payment Country regressions: Late payment
% reg. where coefficient is: Pooled regression % reg. where coefficient is: Pooled regression
negat. & posit. & positive negat. & posit. & positive
signif. signif. (4) z stat. Odds ratio signif. signif. (4) z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.557 0.567 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.543 0.362 Kenya
n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.541 2.140 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.940 0.669 Cameroon
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.586 0.782 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.403 0.234 Cote d'Ivoire
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.782 0.759 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.579 0.263 Burundi
n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.457 0.578 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.691 0.391 Zambia
0% 17% 50% 0.921 1.369 0% 0% 67% 0.380 1.088 Main city
0% 25% 75% 1.262 1.396 0% 0% 75% 0.469 1.165 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
0% 17% 67% 1.870 1.912 0% 50% 100% 3.487 2.397 Textile
17% 33% 67% 0.975 1.647 0% 50% 83% 2.001 1.972 Metal
0% 17% 50% 1.538 1.674 0% 67% 67% 2.334 2.457 Wood
Contractual environment: (5)
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.287 0.557 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.201 0.658 Incidence of payment problems
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.493 1.505 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.700 0.450 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
0% 33% 67% 1.075 1.132 0% 33% 50% 2.048 1.229 Size (2)
0% 33% 67% 2.283 1.283 0% 17% 67% 1.344 1.247 Age (3)
17% 17% 33% -0.343 0.921 17% 33% 83% 0.804 1.204 Limited liability status
0% 20% 100% 0.516 1.179 0% 0% 80% -0.628 0.842 Some state ownership
0% 0% 33% -0.177 0.972 0% 0% 33% -3.451 0.702 Some foreign ownership
0% 17% 83% 5.175 1.468 0% 33% 83% 1.383 1.444 African owner/manager
0% 17% 67% 1.353 1.407 0% 33% 67% 1.318 1.353 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
0% 17% 50% 1.043 1.156 0% 17% 50% -0.117 0.974 Sell to manufacturers/consumers
0% 0% 50% 0.778 1.095 0% 17% 83% 2.597 1.583 Sell to public firms
17% 0% 17% -2.528 0.355 17% 17% 50% -6.300 0.395 Share of exports in sales
954 961 Number of observations
0.061 0.090 Pseudo R-squared
63% 67% Correctly classified observations
(1) Zimbabwe is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Certain variables, such as secondary city and some state ownership, are dropped from some country-level regressions
because they do not apply.  (5) In country-level regressions, contractual environment variables must be dropped because
by construction they are collinear with sectoral dummies.  Significance in country regressions is taken at the 10% level.Table 5. Logit Regression on the Incidence of Contractual Non-Compliance By Suppliers
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Country regressions: Deficient quality Country regressions: Late delivery
% reg. where coefficient is: Pooled regression % reg. where coefficient is: Pooled regression
negat. & posit. & positive negat. & posit. & positive
signif. signif. (4) z stat. Odds ratio signif. signif. (4) z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.496 0.679 n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.837 0.622 Kenya
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.750 0.635 n.a. n.a. n.a. -8.241 0.426 Cameroon
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.949 0.220 n.a. n.a. n.a. -6.252 0.245 Cote d'Ivoire
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.918 0.327 n.a. n.a. n.a. -7.751 0.129 Burundi
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.131 0.911 n.a. n.a. n.a. -3.924 0.246 Zambia
17% 17% 50% 0.379 1.107 0% 17% 33% 1.225 1.441 Main city
0% 0% 25% 0.505 1.151 0% 0% 50% 0.579 1.182 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
17% 0% 33% -1.392 0.655 50% 0% 50% -1.420 0.621 Textile
17% 0% 17% -1.434 0.410 33% 17% 33% -1.238 0.707 Metal
33% 0% 0% -1.546 0.501 20% 0% 40% -1.431 0.579 Wood
Contractual environment: (5)
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.265 0.390 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.738 0.215 Incidence of supplier problems
n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.377 0.614 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.027 0.976 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
17% 50% 83% 3.552 1.240 0% 50% 67% 4.048 1.373 Size (2)
33% 0% 17% -1.929 0.705 17% 0% 17% -1.802 0.751 Age (3)
0% 17% 67% 0.266 1.039 0% 17% 67% 1.053 1.237 Limited liability status
0% 50% 50% 0.499 1.388 0% 33% 33% -0.438 0.858 Some state ownership
17% 0% 50% -1.264 0.655 0% 17% 67% 0.207 1.029 Some foreign ownership
0% 17% 50% 0.676 1.155 17% 0% 33% -0.652 0.779 African owner/manager
0% 17% 83% 0.828 1.345 0% 17% 50% -0.242 0.963 European owner/manager
Relationship with suppliers:
0% 0% 50% -0.547 0.907 0% 17% 67% 0.806 1.194 One supplier monopolistic
17% 0% 33% 1.448 1.274 0% 17% 67% 0.438 1.140 One supplier public firm
17% 0% 33% -0.489 0.998 0% 17% 67% 2.730 1.007 Share of imported inputs
17% 0% 0% -1.248 0.994 33% 0% 33% -0.005 1.000 % purchases from main supplier
17% 17% 50% 0.306 1.037 0% 0% 50% -0.332 0.985 Length of relationship (6)
0% 0% 67% 0.862 1.182 0% 33% 100% 3.183 2.068 One supplier friend or family
0% 17% 67% -1.883 0.731 0% 17% 50% -1.291 0.719 Dummy for infrequent purchases
0% 33% 67% 1.846 1.326 0% 17% 50% 1.185 1.249 Receives supplier credit
0% 25% 75% 3.553 2.921 0% 25% 50% 0.604 1.169 Gives advance payment
802 803 Number of observations
0.084 0.132 Pseudo R-squared
65% 69% Correctly classified observations
(1) Zimbabwe is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Certain variables, such as secondary city and some state ownership, are dropped from some country-level regressions
because they do not apply.  (5) In country-level regressions, contractual environment variables must be dropped because
by construction they are collinear with sectoral dummies.  Significance in country regressions is taken at the 10% level.
(6) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.Table 6. Tobit Regression on the Incidence of Contractual Breach By Clients
Dependent variable is the log of the number of problems per year + 1.
Non-payment Late payment
t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
-5.423 -1.843 -2.123 -0.965 Kenya
-4.062 -1.639 -3.108 -2.113 Cote d'Ivoire
-4.995 -1.949 -2.689 -1.593 Burundi
-5.172 -1.801 -1.647 -0.720 Zambia
1.881 0.330 0.327 0.070 Main city
0.508 0.117 0.752 0.204 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
0.496 0.105 3.612 0.941 Textile
-0.338 -0.072 1.591 0.440 Metal
0.499 0.106 2.061 0.568 Wood
Contractual environment: (5)
0.929 0.980 0.032 0.038 Incidence of payment problems
-0.616 -0.406 -0.255 -0.203 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
1.886 0.109 4.343 0.319 Size (2)
1.650 0.169 0.999 0.128 Age (3)
-1.750 -0.302 0.670 0.141 Limited liability status
1.444 0.475 -0.269 -0.121 Some state ownership
0.957 0.165 -0.850 -0.188 Some foreign ownership
1.434 0.256 1.362 0.301 African owner/manager
0.068 0.014 1.758 0.458 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
0.807 0.141 1.208 0.258 Sell to manufacturers/consumers
0.584 0.092 1.399 0.274 Sell to public firms
-2.180 -0.751 -2.008 -0.860 Share of exports in sales
0.073 0.055 -0.636 -0.763 Intercept
735 778 Number of observations
413 333 of which are zero
0.082 0.074 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Zimbabwe is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).Table 7. Tobit Regression on the Incidence of Contractual Breach By Suppliers
Dependent variable is the log of the number of problems per year + 1.
Deficient quality Late delivery
t stat. Coef. t stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
-0.218 -0.090 -1.554 -0.768 Kenya
-2.239 -1.721 -3.788 -2.906 Cote d'Ivoire
-1.423 -0.996 -3.678 -3.333 Burundi
1.185 0.498 -2.887 -1.962 Zambia
1.137 0.259 1.465 0.482 Main city
0.072 0.020 -0.116 -0.046 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-2.429 -0.708 -1.640 -0.579 Textile
-3.021 -1.274 -0.745 -0.269 Metal
-2.079 -0.706 -0.458 -0.174 Wood
Contractual environment: (5)
-0.729 -1.135 -1.227 -2.705 Incidence of supplier problems
0.404 0.318 0.091 0.098 Recourse to legal system
Firm characteristics:
3.017 0.233 3.862 0.408 Size (2)
-2.642 -0.406 -1.918 -0.401 Age (3)
-0.274 -0.059 1.125 0.341 Limited liability status
1.869 0.917 0.576 0.379 Some state ownership
-0.769 -0.186 -0.284 -0.089 Some foreign ownership
-0.137 -0.031 -1.287 -0.392 African owner/manager
2.405 0.631 0.930 0.318 European owner/manager
Relationship with suppliers:
-0.386 -0.075 1.252 0.331 One supplier monopolistic
0.599 0.122 -0.209 -0.058 One supplier public firm
-1.223 -0.004 2.623 0.011 Share of imported inputs
-0.958 -0.003 0.408 0.002 % purchases from main supplier
0.802 0.075 -0.016 -0.002 Length of relationship (4)
0.466 0.146 2.932 1.155 One supplier friend or family
-0.566 -0.126 -2.233 -0.701 Dummy for infrequent purchases
2.098 0.390 0.959 0.237 Receives supplier credit
1.410 0.725 -0.912 -0.680 Gives advance payment
0.651 0.898 0.336 0.499 Intercept
660 659 Number of observations
390 438 of which are zero
0.079 0.117 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Zimbabwe is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.Table 8. Multinomial Logit Regression on Conflict Resolution Method With Clients
Direct bargaining only is the omitted category.
Bargaining + Legal institutions
Legal institutions only (6) Doing nothing
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
-0.012 -0.010 -2.749 -4.209 0.186 0.224 Kenya
1.521 1.008 -2.068 -3.214 0.110 0.122 Cameroon
-0.565 -0.535 -2.450 -6.052 0.094 0.132 Cote d'Ivoire
-0.807 -0.706 0.000 -37.147 -0.782 -1.174 Burundi
-0.615 -0.467 -3.390 -5.038 -0.528 -0.603 Zambia
0.150 0.062 -0.061 -0.059 -0.133 -0.079 Main city
-0.412 -0.217 0.777 0.798 0.626 0.435 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-0.264 -0.123 0.242 0.221 -0.741 -0.438 Textile
1.096 0.549 1.256 1.203 0.599 0.384 Metal
-0.104 -0.048 -1.539 -1.585 -1.378 -0.949 Wood
-0.439 -1.100 -2.019 -12.018 -0.142 -0.512 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
2.443 0.362 3.578 1.029 -0.335 -0.079 Size (2)
2.204 0.550 1.137 0.607 -0.557 -0.212 Age (3)
1.506 0.636 0.739 0.728 0.886 0.557 Limited liability status
1.462 1.107 0.000 -34.584 0.000 -32.618 Some state ownership
-0.749 -0.308 -0.327 -0.268 -1.501 -1.050 Some foreign ownership
-0.630 -0.289 -0.472 -0.417 -2.687 -1.739 African owner/manager
-0.405 -0.221 -1.865 -1.924 -1.240 -1.091 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
0.613 0.239 0.229 0.156 0.477 0.291 Sell to manufacturers/consumers
-0.473 -0.183 -0.074 -0.058 -1.491 -1.209 Sell to public firms
-1.106 -0.930 -1.164 -2.563 -1.003 -1.426 Share of exports in sales
Characteristics of problematic client:
1.229 0.448 1.578 1.175 2.395 1.337 Individual
-0.812 -0.381 -0.584 -0.580 -1.006 -0.727 Relative or same ethnicity
-1.598 -0.291 -1.364 -0.566 0.469 0.122 Length of relationship (4)
3.604 1.135 2.882 1.865 -0.107 -0.051 Dispute is about non-payment (5):
-2.165 -3.613 0.067 0.249 -0.157 -0.412 Intercept
360 Number of observations
0.248 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Zimbabwe is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Length of relationship = log(years of acquaintance with problematic client +1).
(5) As opposed to late payment.
(6) Recourse to one or more of the following: private arbitration; police; lawyers; courts. 
Threats of recourse to police and courts are included.Table 9. Multinomial Logit Regression on Conflict Resolution Method With Suppliers
Direct bargaining only is the omitted category.
Some use of 
Legal institutions (5) Doing nothing
z stat. Coef. z stat. Coef. Location dummies (1)
0.205 0.273 -1.547 -1.232 Cameroon
-0.527 -1.028 -1.803 -2.130 Ivory-Coast
-0.669 -1.528 -1.118 -1.503 Burundi
-0.367 -0.592 -1.317 -1.229 Zambia
0.143 0.122 1.048 0.535 Main city
-0.193 -0.200 0.777 0.456 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
-1.770 -1.863 -1.569 -0.903 Textile
-0.995 -0.861 -1.315 -0.802 Metal
-1.300 -1.722 -1.979 -1.542 Wood
-1.497 -7.952 -0.315 -1.005 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
2.009 0.564 0.462 0.087 Size (2)
0.999 0.499 1.641 0.530 Age (3)
0.037 0.030 -1.809 -0.795 Limited liability status
-0.697 -0.905 -0.322 -0.281 Some state ownership
-0.303 -0.259 0.418 0.222 Some foreign ownership
0.798 0.686 0.237 0.120 African owner/manager
-0.478 -0.489 -1.226 -0.642 European owner/manager
Relationship with supplier:
-0.259 -0.191 -1.779 -0.764 One supplier monopolistic
-0.909 -0.674 1.490 0.587 One supplier public firm
0.243 0.003 -1.872 -0.013 Share of imported inputs
1.207 0.016 2.410 0.020 % purchases from main supplier
-1.824 -0.617 -0.977 -0.225 Length of relationship (3)
-0.151 -0.185 1.312 0.808 One supplier friend or family
-0.509 -0.394 -0.005 -0.003 Dummy for infrequent purchases
0.998 0.643 0.404 0.166 Receives supplier credit
0.693 0.747 0.125 0.124 Gives advance payment
-0.035 -0.021 -1.534 -0.577 Dispute about deficient quality (4):
Characteristics of problematic supplier:
1.144 1.805 0.000 -32.299 Dummy if first time supplier
0.176 0.074 -1.687 -0.426 Length of relationship (3)
2.455 2.874 2.154 1.613 Dummy if public firm
-0.254 -0.364 1.127 0.786 Dummy if individual consumer
-0.345 -1.242 0.042 0.096 Intercept
266 Number of observations
0.191 Pseudo R-squared
(1) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (2) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(3) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.
(4) As opposed to late or non delivery.
(5) Some recourse to one of the following: private arbitration; police; lawyers; courts.
Threats of recourse to police and courts are included.Table 10. Logit Regressions on Settlement of Contractual Disputes With Clients
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Trade relation Settlement Dispute
continues satisfactory (6) settled
z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
-0.909 0.616 3.051 3.760 -0.412 0.771 Kenya
-0.553 0.728 -1.233 0.551 -9.721 0.122 Cameroon
-0.845 0.482 -0.185 0.886 -0.765 0.495 Cote d'Ivoire
0.715 1.657 -1.723 0.247 -1.525 0.384 Burundi
2.452 2.760 0.602 1.415 Zambia
-0.426 0.878 0.652 2.044 -0.612 0.812 Main city
-1.309 0.585 -0.178 0.778 -1.027 0.711 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
0.181 1.100 -1.257 0.458 -1.742 0.498 Textile
-0.728 0.865 -1.842 0.263 -11.369 0.210 Metal
-0.155 0.937 -1.967 0.461 -1.957 0.443 Wood
0.356 1.804 2.719 392.868 1.083 13.319 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
0.248 1.017 -2.142 0.668 1.600 1.256 Size (2)
-0.576 0.837 1.300 1.963 1.163 1.469 Age (3)
-0.031 0.989 0.811 2.208 0.402 1.151 Limited liability status
1.143 3.178 2.015 5.607 -0.467 0.761 Some state ownership
0.186 1.121 3.271 2.489 -0.152 0.971 Some foreign ownership
-0.938 0.609 2.318 5.964 2.279 2.733 African owner/manager
-1.748 0.421 -0.585 0.633 0.229 1.098 European owner/manager
Relationship with clients:
2.139 2.564 0.518 1.324 1.071 1.803 Sell to manufacturers/consumers
-3.007 0.463 0.223 1.215 -4.141 0.489 Sell to public firms
0.611 1.846 1.734 3.569 -0.253 0.850 Share of exports in sales
Characteristics of problematic client:
0.097 1.047 -0.730 0.526 -2.374 0.409 Individual
-0.400 0.875 -0.351 0.750 2.518 2.605 Relative or same ethnicity
1.230 1.452 -2.123 0.643 -0.658 0.879 Length of relationship (4)
-11.847 0.179 -3.681 0.129 -4.548 0.173 Dispute is about non-payment (5):
Conflict resolution method:
1.654 1.433 -2.433 0.400 6.401 2.510 Direct negociations
-0.282 0.761 -0.102 0.884 1.794 2.725 Private arbitration
-2.473 0.385 0.028 1.049 -2.052 0.306 Police
-5.731 0.263 -2.441 0.369 -1.205 0.711 Lawyers and courts
279 184 358 Number of observations
0.255 0.269 0.270 Pseudo R-squared
76% 85% 78% Correctly classified
(1) Zimbabwe is the omitted country; small town is the omitted city category.
(2) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (3) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(4) Length of relationship = log(years of acquaintance with problematic client +1).
(5) As opposed to late payment.
(6) Conditional on the dispute being settled.Table 11. Logit Regressions on Settlement of Contractual Disputes With Suppliers
(Robust standard errors reported using country-level clustering)
Trade relationship
continues Dispute settled
z stat. Odds ratio z stat. Odds ratio Location dummies (1)
-1.441 0.222 n.a. n.a. Kenya
n.a. n.a. 1.034 2.139 Cameroon
3.229 195.856 1.822 3.126 Ivory-Coast
2.894 177.637 1.637 4.476 Burundi
n.a. n.a. 0.563 1.191 Zambia
1.469 1.542 -1.708 0.483 Main city
1.301 1.679 -0.805 0.797 Secondary city
Sectoral dummies:
2.425 1.674 2.582 2.581 Textile
1.190 1.688 1.313 1.581 Metal
-0.713 0.646 0.885 1.678 Wood
3.048 2E+07 3.402 19.941 Average incidence of problems:
Firm characteristics:
3.796 1.125 -0.172 0.961 Size (2)
3.249 1.919 -1.573 0.703 Age (3)
0.458 1.340 -0.373 0.842 Limited liability status
-0.660 0.728 1.497 8.845 Some state ownership
-0.139 0.970 -0.431 0.742 Some foreign ownership
1.804 1.833 -0.252 0.732 African owner/manager
-0.166 0.919 -0.086 0.927 European owner/manager
Relationship with suppliers:
1.686 3.088 -0.688 0.844 One supplier monopolistic
3.466 1.702 1.789 1.532 One supplier public firm
-2.413 0.995 0.899 1.005 Share of imported inputs
1.312 1.005 0.090 1.001 % purchases from main supplier
0.575 1.142 1.854 1.404 Length of relationship (4)
-2.529 0.222 -0.915 0.575 One supplier friend or family
-1.702 0.676 -4.357 0.385 Dummy for infrequent purchases
6.124 2.606 -0.125 0.934 Receives supplier credit
-0.183 0.863 1.356 3.052 Gives advance payment
Characteristics of problematic supplier:
-0.950 0.182 -0.910 0.482 Dummy if first time supplier
-2.185 0.382 0.343 1.076 Length of relationship (4)
-0.988 0.717 -6.455 0.214 Dummy if public firm
1.241 2.213 0.179 1.110 Dummy if individual
-0.417 0.926 -0.266 0.911 Dispute about deficient quality (5):
Conflict resolution method:
not included (6) 13.105 4.335 Direct negociations
not included (6) 1.289 2.283 Use of legal institutions
230 262 Number of observations
0.254 0.182 Pseudo R-squared
83% 76% Correctly classified
(1) Firm size = log(number of employees +1); (2) Firm age = log(1995 - year of inception).
(3) Log of average length of relationship with suppliers in years +1.
(4) Length of relationship = log(years of acquaintance with problematic client +1).
(5) As opposed to late or non delivery.
(6) These variables could not be included in the regression due to insufficient
number of observations.